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OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

GENUINE PARTS C 0 . #

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

)
)

GENE LARSON JR., dba TRUCK PARTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case N o . 14414

)
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against the defendant based
upon checks of the defendant which were returned by the defendant's
bank, and also Promissory Notes signed subsequent thereto by the
defendant.

A Default Judgment was taken, and defendant filed

various Motions to Quash and to Set Aside the Judgment.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court denied defendant's Motions to Quash and
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, from which the defendant appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

From the Affidavits and Exhibits thereto, the following
facts appear in the record:
In the fall of 1974, the plaintiff-respondent. Genuine
Parts, hereinafter designated as the plaintiff;! began selling
parts and truck parts to the defendant and checks (R. p 31) were
given by defendant, Larson, in payment.

The checks were returned

from the bank upon which they were drawn.

The defendant was given

a credit for $7,000.00 on December 30 and 31, 1974 (R. pp 28-30).
The manager for plaintiff contacted the defendant and demanded
payment, whereupon the defendant signed a series of Promissory
Notes of $1,000.00 each bearing eight percent (8%) interest, and
the interest upon said notes was payable monthly (R. pp 33-44).
With said notes, Larson gave Genuine Parts another check for
$1,000.00 (R. p 45), which was also dishonored at drawee's
bank (R. p 4 5 ) . Thereafter, Larson made no payments of either

-2-
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principal or interest upon any of the notes (R. pp 1 4 - 1 5 ) . . . ,
Genuine Parts took possession qf certain merchandise on April 30,
1975, for which credit was issued to Larson in the sum of $3,366.37
on April 30, 1975 (R. p 50). Thereafter, on the 29th day of May, .
1975, the attorney for Genuine Parts sent Larson a letter making
demand for payment (R. p 27). Still no payment was made or

V4

tendered by Larson (Larson's Affidavit R. pp 14-15) ...,,,;... ,.•
On the 17th day of July, 1975, Larson was served with
a Summons (R. p 5) containing the following wording:

,,. • ^

"This is an action on two claims; Claim I: on
checks which have been returned by the bank marked
'Refer to Maker,1 which have a balance due and owing
in the sum of $9,914.47, for interest thereon, plus
., a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of Court;
Claim II: on Notes, which have a balance due and
.
...
owing in the sum of $9,914.47, for interest thereon
(P
per the Notes, for a reasonable attorney's fee and
w.,:
/; all costs of Court."
,-.-,•-•-•-.••.;,: ••...-•.•>!:-,
Cj

. , ,.f,

Thereafter, on the 29th day of July, 1975, a copy of the Complaint
was mailed to the defendant at the same address as the demand letter
(R. p 3 ) .

The defendant claims that he didn't receive a copy of

the Complaint, but admitted that he resided at the s p e
until the "last part of July."

(R. pp 14-15)

address

Twenty-eight

(28)

days thereafter, on the 26th <3ay of August, 1975, a Default Judgment

-3-
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was taken against the defendant, and a Supplemental Order issued
thereon which was served upon defendant on "September 17, 1975
(R. p 9 ) . On the 14th day of October, 1975, the defendant signed
an Affidavit (R. pp 14-15) claiming he had not received a copy '

K

of the Complaint and thereafter moved to quash service of process
and to set aside the Judgment on the grounds that the defendant

;1;C

"

did not receive a copy of the Complaint and misrepresentation '"
and misconduct of the plaintiff, and general relief pursuant
to Rule 60(b), togetHe't vfri'th an Affidavit contending that he was
entitled to a credit of $7,852.29 because of oil delivered in
October of 1975, taken back by plaintiff, and claiming that an
employee of the defendant, Brad (sic) Willowby had taken more
that $4,000.00 in merchandise on the account, that the defendant
had not resided at 4650 Westview Drive since the last of July, and
further that Larson had attempted to negotiate a settlement, ' : ^
but the plaintiff had refused to "cooperate" with him.
of any payments upon the notes were ever made.

No claim

Another Affidavit

was filed by Howard Brinton stating that certain merchandise ~*
(R. pp 18-20) had been taken by plaintiff, but no credit given.

Ji;

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed Affidavits' and Exhibits (R. pp 28-50)

"-4-
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showing that one of the credits claimed in defendant's Affidavit
was given to him prior to the defendant's signing a series of
Promissory Notes, and the credit of $7,000.00 for oil was agreed
upon at the signing of the Promissory Notes; and further, that
the return of the merchandise shown at R. pp 18-20 had been
properly given credit to the plaintiff of $3,366.37 in arriving
at a balance without accrued interest of $9,714.47, which was sued
upon. At the hearing on the Motion, based upon representations -^"
of counsel and the Affidavits, the trial court denied the Motion
of defendant (R. pp 52-53).
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:

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW IS AFFORDED BY THE APPLICATION OF A SPECIFIC COURSE OF PROCEDURE TO LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
IN WHICH A PARTICULAR PERSON IS AFFECTED, WHEN SUCH A COURSE
IS ALSO APPLIED TO ANY OTHER PERSON IN THE STATE UNDER SIMILAR
CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS. : . .../_», ; ..

In the case of Missouri v. Lewis, 101 US 22, 25 L.Ed.
987 (1946), it was held that equal protection under the law
with respect to legal proceedings does not require that every
person in the land shall possess the same rights and privileges
of every other person, and does not forbid proper and reasonable
classification in the field of Court proceedings.

It is a well

settled rule that a state may classify persons and objects for the
purpose of legislation, and may pass laws applicable only to
persons or objects within a designated class.
316 US 535, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 62 S.Ct. 1110.

Skinner v. Oklahoma/

All persons within the

State of Utah are afforded the same procedures and safeguards set
forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

These Rules apply

equally to all persons situated within the State of Utah.

Those

provisions of the Utah Rules regarding the ten-day summons are
applicable to all defendants whose actions are instigated by the
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filing of a summons.

Further, the time period set forth in the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all civil litigants in the
State of Utah.

• »• -<

?

>

"• '

- "• ». -

> :i

:

' '
)J i

The case of Dohany v. Rodgers, 281 US 362, 74 L.Ed.
(Adv. 365), 50 S.Ct. Reporter 299, 68 ALR 434, 441, holds that
the due process clause does not guarantee to the citizen of a
state any particular form or method of state procedure.

. . ."The

requirements are satisfied, if he has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and present his claim or defense,
due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the
character of the rights which may be affected by it.

Nor does

the equal protection clause exact uniformity of procedure."

It

is obviously the intent of the Utah Supreme Court in adopting
those Rules, to afford two separate means of commencing a legal
action, those being by the service of a Summons or by the filing
of a Complaint.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were formulated

to provide a definite framework within which civil litigation
is to be conducted.

In this case, the record demonstrates that

all procedural aspects of the rules were followed, to the letter,
by the plaintiff in securing its Judgment.

The Rules of Civil
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Procedure clearly set forth the procedure to be followed in

;

utilizing Rule 3(a)(2) in the commencement of a civil action by
the service of a Summons.

This Rule provides that the Complaint

together with the Summons and proof of service must be filed
within ten (10) days after service of the Summons, and that a
copy of the Complaint must be served upon or mailed to the defendant if his address is known.

In this case, defendant's address

was known, and he was mailed a copy of the Complaint on the
29th day of July, 1975.

By his own Affidavit, at pages 14 and

15 of the Record, the defendant indicated that he resided at the
address until the end of July, 1975.

Therefore, it was not neces-

sary to deposit a copy of the Complaint with the Court, since the
defendant's address was known and a copy of the Complaint was
mailed to that address.

Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure, entitled "Time," sets forth the method to use in computing
the time provisions embodied within the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The ten-day time period set forth in Rule 3(a) is to be

determined in accordance with Rule 6.

Subsection (a) of Rule 6

states that, "in computing any period of time prescribed by or
allowed by these rules, the day of the act, event or default from
which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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included.

The last day of the period so computed shall be in- '

eluded, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday,'" "
in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
i.

which is not a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday."

In this

case, the tenth day after service of the Summons fell on a Sunday,
and according to Rule 6, since it is not possible to file the
Complaint on that day, it is to be filed by the end of the next
day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday.

In

this case, the following day was Monday, on which day the Complaint
was filed, totally in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

As set forth on page 6 of appellant's brief, the

Honorable Bryant H. Croft entered his Order declaring that the
Complaint was filed within the prescribed period after service
of the Summons as determined and computed by the Utah Rules 0 f ' ^ ;
Civil Procedure.

Therefore, the Court was vested with jurisdiction

upon the service of the Summons, which jurisdiction did continue
and at no time lapsed between the service of Summons and the
rendering of Judgment, as set forth in Rule 3(c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
r

';J '

The appellant's brief states that the foregoing Order

was entered in contravention of Rule 77a, since the District
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Courts are to be deemed always open for the purpose of filing
any pleading or other proper paper.

-

This statement, however,

totally overlooks the fact that Saturday and Sunday are not
includable in the time computation periods because documents
cannot be filed on those days since the clerk's office is closed,
in accordance with Rule 77(c), on Saturdays, Sundays and legal •-•"•
holidays.

The concept of the Court being open at all times and

yet having the clerk's office closed on Saturdays, Sundays and
legal holidays are totally compatible and within the purview of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
s ^

Appellant further claims that Rule 52(a) was violated

by the above mentioned Order of the Honorable Bryant H. Croft,
but he does not say in what manner.

Rule 52(a), specifically

states that Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are unnecessary for decisions on Motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other
Motion except as provided in Rule 41(b), said Rule 41(b) applying
to dismissals granted upon Motion at trial.
In addition, appellant claims that he was not given
sufficient time to answer the Complaint, that he was not granted
the full twenty (20) days, and in fact, only received nine (9) U:
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days in which to answer and formulate his defenses.

In this case/

the defendant didn't even bother to file an Answer within the
time required by the Rules, or otherwise.

The Judgment in question

was not taken until thirty

(30) days after mailing the Complaint

to the defendant and forty

(40) days after service of the Summons

upon the defendant.
ter at issue.

r.

A n intervening Answer would have put the mat-

However, the record is clear that the defendant

. c.

didn't contact plaintiff's attorney and in fact ignored the process
until his inventory was attached on or about the 1st day of
October, 1975.

. f^rbsucn-i

;*. v.'r) ;:to ^isxub

u

.:

r/^r

. -

/;;;:,;; Appellant makes the contention that the Summons does
not give him any notice of the nature of the case against him,
the Summons at Record, page 5, sets forth the following:

v{
*v

, :: -

"This is an action on two claims; Claim I: on
; ^
checks which have been returned by the bank marked
: • 'Refer to Maker', which have a balance due and owing .-: :in the sum of $9,914.47, for interest thereon, plus
;
7,T:.y.i -v:.r a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of Court;
Claim II; on Notes, which have a balance due and owing
in the sum of $9,914.47, for interest thereon per the
Notes, for a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs
.. r.s^rs of Court." ; ,„tnr< sw.:*5- •• ~I\J..I •:*•.•• K- .-;r\i.: , • - </ r.No where in the Affidavits filed does appellant make any statement
that he had any transactions with this plaintiff other than the
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matters set forth in the Complaint.

Surely appellant knew when

he was served with the Summons what the transaction was and why
he was being sued-.

%' , 4r /

~

> j

;

t /

n;v

:

-;

Furthermore, under notice pleading, as set forth in

^

'> ve
:

Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant would
receive very little more information if served with a Complaint
rather than a Summons.

Rule 8(a) provides only that the pleading

shall contain a short, plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for Judgment to
which he deems himself entitled.

The Summons itself indicates

• IG

what type of claim is being alleged against the defendant, and it
also states that he will demand Judgment according to this claim C
should the defendant fail to answer the charges set forth within
twenty (20) days.

Defendant knows at this point that he has

twenty (20) days to answer the claim or claims set forth against
him; and pursuant to Rule 8(b), the defendant may deny the allegations by stating that he does not have enough information upon
which to form a sufficient answer to admit or deny the averments
of the Complaint, or he may simply deny generally everything
alleged in the claim.

—

<

.>.

•.- /..,. •;•.; [,-,c ..-.o"'
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; srv'w

This Honorable Court in adopting the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure had in mind to specifically provide two means of com- ;

3

•

mencing an action in the State of Utah, that being by Summons or •
by Complaint, and under no circumstances do these Rules, and
specifically Rule 3 (a) , cause cuny violation, of the defendant's
right to due process and equal protection under the law.

<_ c

Further-

more, the defendant was afforded the same rights as any other
defendant

:

in the State of Utah under like circumstances.

-<
. .. .

He

was given adequate notice of the claims made against him, and
afforded an opportunity to be heard on them.

Only through his

: ,fw

own indolence did he fail to meet the allegations of plaintiff's
Complaint.. .

: . -t I v:

. . .. ;. x'.-u"...

...

••• 1:1 j:vv ±;'x J r ;.'::• s s ^ J . : . \:,~i.s

POINT II
:

'.••'. "-'•' -v; JSIIJ

3ti.i-y-i

ax.

. .

.

..,...;

)/f£!;••: ':_.*"

.

. .- , '/ - /

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IS A SUBJECT WHOLLY WITHIN
THE STATE'S POWER TO REGULATE AND CONTROL.

v

,,

or;*. As stated in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 US 278, 80 L.Ed, j
682,

56 S.Ct. 461 (1936), the states have the right to govern and

control the procedures and actions of the Courts within their
boundaries; and since we are not involved with a suspect criteria,
such as race, nationality or alienage, nor a fundamental First
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Amendment right requiring a compelling governmental interest .:. ........
before it may be significantly regulated, all that is required
is that the legislation involved have a rational justification
for its existence.

Flemming v. Nestor, 363 US 603.

The case cited

on page 11 of appellant's brief entitled, Cuebas y Arrendohdo v.
Cuebas y Arrendondo, 223 US 376, 56L.Ed. 467, 32 S.Ct. 277 (1912),
which holds that a Judgment by Default must be justified by the
pleadings is totally in accordance with the case before the Court,
since the Default Judgment was based upon the pleadings, and a
Complaint and Summons were filed as required by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

In any event, it can be seen from the record,

that regardless of any time procedures, the defendant simply chose
to ignore the Summons and the action that was filed, and that he
made no attempt to answer any part of the allegations or confront
the plaintiff until an execution issued against defendant's property,
more than a month after the Default Judgment had been entered.
,.%-&.... -,. p 0 I N T

1IZ

PRESENTMENT AND NOTICE OF DISHONOR ARE NOT NECESSARY
IN ORDER TO CHARGE THE MAKER OF A NOTE, BECAUSE A MAKER IS
PRIMARILY LIABLE ON THE INSTRUMENT,
Sec. 70A-3-501 of the Utah Code regarding presentment
and notice of dishonor and protest is applicable only to secondary
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parties, and Sec. 70A-3-102(d), Utah Code Annotated, defines a ^
secondary party as a drawer or endorser.

Under no section or

-"

provision of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code is the payee of a
note charged with the requirement of presentment or notice of
dishonor to the maker thereof.

This fact is further illustrated

by Sec. 70A-3-511 regarding waiver or excuse of presentment or --—-'•
notice of dishonor.

Sec. 70A-3-511(2) states that presentment

or notice of protest, as the case may be, is entirely excused when,
"(b)

such party has himself dishonored the instrument or has

countermanded payment or otherwise has no reason to expect or
right to require that the instrument be accepted or paid.11

' »*

A

maker of a note, as in this case where the notes have specific

Jv

-

due dates, is on notice that the note has been dishonored and has
personal knowledge of non-payment, since he is the person who
was to make the payment.

Presentment and notice of dishonor

-

are generally required of secondary parties where they would have *
no knowledge of whether or not payment was made, and therefore
are required to be given notice so that they may take the appropriate action to protect themselves or make payment.

However,

as to primary makers, Sec. 70A-3-413(l) provides that, "the
maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instrument

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

accordingly to its terms at the time of his engagement or as ^ i ;
completed pursuant to Sec. 70A-3-115 on incomplete instruments."
POINT IV
'K" WHERE AN INSTRUMENT REPRESENTS AN UNDERLYING OBLIGATION,
JUDGMENT MAY BE TAKEN ON EITHER THE INSTRUMENT ITSELF, OR ON THE
UNDERLYING OBLIGATION. : r i ;' - v- ^-'
.-.:
n ^; ",:
Sec. 70A-3-802 (1) (b) provides that unless otherwise
agreed where an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation,
"in any other case, except where the bank is drawer, maker, or
acceptor, the obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instrument is due or if it is payable on demand until its presentment.
If the instrument is dishonored action may be maintained on
either the instrument or the obligation."

As is the case before

the Court now, the Promissory Notes evidences an underlying obligation and debt of the defendant to the plaintiff.

Defendant, in

its brief fails to recognize the fact that the Complaint alleges
two separate claims, one on checks returned by the bank, and one
on the Promissory Notes. The Judgment, therefore, was based upon
the bad checks, and the Notes, as evidenced by the underlying
obligations.

Judgment could have been sustained on any of these

three possible grounds. By failing to answer the Complaint, the
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defendant has admited to the truthfulness of the allegations of
the Complaint, and plaintiff is not required to establish his
cause of action by proof.

G-,

Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;

49 C.J.S., Judgments, Section 230.
.:';•!, •"

As to the notes sued upon, they were an arrangement for

installment payments of the underlying obligation.

By their.;.-!

terms, payment of the interest upon all of the notes was due and
payable monthly.

Breach of any one installment by the defendant

would give rise to a cause of action on all of the notes as well
as the underlying obligation which would be the total open account
which the installment notes represent.

It was undisputed from the

Affidavits of the parties that appellant never voluntarily paid
any amount on these notes. Even the check he gave on January 21,
1975, was returned marked, "refer to maker."

The only credit to

follow was for merchandise taken from appellant by the plaintiff
in the sum of $3,366.37, on April 30, 1975, (R. 50) still leaving
a default upon the series of obligations.

Thereafter, by letter

(R. 27), Genuine Parts informed the defendant that unless he brought
up to date the promissory notes which were in default including
the original $1,000.00 which the defendant was to pay plaintiff
on this account, it would proceed with legal action on the matter.
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A similar fact situation is seen in the case of Beckom v. Scott,
Texas Civil Appeals, 142 SW 80, where demand on the first of a
series of notes was held to be sufficient to mature the whole
series.

v;T.C

The defendant was aware that suit would be proceeding on

all notes because of failure to make payment on any of the notes.
Sec. 7-15-1 and Sec. 7-15-2, state that whenever a person
makes a check or draft drawn on a bank which is subsequently

' ;e

dishonored, for the purpose of obtaining anything of value, he
shall be liable to the holder of the check or draft in a civil

:

action including all costs and attorney's fees incurred by the /i^
necessity of the lawsuit.

It is clear from the record that the

defendant initially purchased goods from the plaintiff and paid

;

for the goods by checks, which were not honored by the bank, then
made notes to the defendant which were again not honored, showing
an intent on his part to receive these goods without paying for
them, and with the intent to defraud the plaintiff of his goods. %
The defendant was given notice by letter to make good on the r JV
checks and to make good on the promissory notes.

However, appel-

lant made no payment and took no action to pay the notes, or to
answer this lawsuit until a Writ of Execution had issued against
his property.

:

« :- . •

; V r.- •'.•-•:-
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:

-.OAUI

O.-.-J-V/L-.-.^vL '-'••

-'^

POINT V

.1 *- t^-.^J. -• r...-

:.^: • .

SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT RESTS WITHIN THE SOUND
DISCRETION OF THE COURT, AND APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH
ANY GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE! JUDGMENT COULD BE SET ASIDE.

?:$$on ; The jurisdiction of the State of Utah as well as other
states have alsways required the showing of adequate grounds to set
aside a default and that the defendant has a meritorious defense ";
to the action.

Ogle v. Miller, 491 P2d 40, 87 Nev. 573 (1971);

Becker v. Roothe, 339 P2d 292, 184 Kan. 830 (1959); Warren v. '

'.' •

Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P2d 719, 123 U 416 (1953); Yurkas v. Zampotti,
171 P2d 455, 75 Ca.2d 493 (1946).

The Summons with which the

defendant admits was served upon him, sets forth as much information
as necessary to state a claim according to the required forms

: :^

for Complaints set out in the appendix of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The defendant, therefore, was fully aware of the nature

of the claim against him even though he denies that he ever re- ri
ceived a copy of the Complaint.

The important question is, what

did the defendant do after he was served?

L

His Affidavits show

that he did nothing after service of the Summons except move from '
his address.

Whether or not he filed a change of address notice

necessary to forward mail from that address is left open to conjecture and certainly may be the reason why he did not receive a
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copy of the Complaint.

In any event, the Affidavits offer no

^

reason why the defendant failed to file an Answer except that
he claims not to have received a copy of the Complaint, yet as .much information is stated in the Summons under the Rules of Notice
Pleadings as required in the Complaint.

The record shows un-

questionably that the Complaint was mailed to the defendant's last
known address and there is no indication that the Complaint was
returned to plaintiff's attorney.

The question of where that '

Complaint ended up is left in limbo because the defendant moved
from-his address after he was served.

.r

r; •-/.•; ••.?•- •::--• ivo ••

In short, statements set forth in the Affidavits do
not show any mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect on the part of the defendant, any newly discovered evidence, any fraud or misrepresentation or any reason for which
the Judgment is void, satisfied or released or any other reason
for which this Court has allowed relief from a Judgment or Order
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.- '-•-.]:•••
The only defense which appellant raises to the action
is that of credits that he should have, and the Affidavits of the
plaintiff in response to the defendant's Affidavits show that
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all of the credits claimed by the defendant in his various

0

,;i;- ,

Affidavits have in fact been given to him in arriving at the ^(!...
amount of the Judgment.

From these Affidavits, the Order of E ;

the trial court (R. pp 52-53) concludes that the defendant had
raised no elements as required by Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of

*r:

(

,

;rtj3. .

Civil Procedure, or meritorious defenses to warrant setting aside -.
the Judgment.
rect.

This finding must be presumed to be valid and cor-

The burden of showing that the finding is in error or that f

it is so seriously inequitable that it manifests a clear abuse
of discretion by the Court is upon the appellant, Warren v. Dixon
Ranch Co. , supra. 1 %;.

•—: :. < .:

•? „f... •;.:;-. A

%

;i vc -is aX

.As this Court held in Airkem Intermountain, Inc.-v./,. -^v.
Parker, 30 U2d 65, 513 P2d 429 (1973), "The Rule that the Courts
will incline towards granting relief to a party, who has not had
the opportunity to present his case, is ordinarily applied at

t

;

the trial court level, and this Court will not reverse the determination of the trial court merely because the Motion could have
been granted."

Since the defendant's conduct in that case was

not entirely inexcusable, the Court found no abuse of discretion _ jby the trial court in refusing to set aside that Judgment.

-21Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In

-, ,

the present case, the record before this Court serves to underscore
appellant's total and contemptuous disregard of the judicial :...v c ^
process, which alone may provide grounds for denial of his Motion
to Set Aside the Judgment, Weinberger v. Manning, 50 Cal. App.2d 494,
123 P2d 531 (1942); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., supra. ,.•-, ex;•; • c:i
> . Regarding defendant's contention that Judgment was;'

iv*

taken on notes which had not matured and which were not able to
be accelerated, the notes are simply a debt to be paid off in
installments.

The defendant was to pay $1,000.00 down, which he

did by a check that was returned unpaid, marked, "refer to maker."
He was then to pay $1,000.00 each month in accordance with the
Promissory Notes.

As can be seen, each Promissory Note called

for interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) to be paid monthly.
Further, the notes reveal on their face that the interest declines
each successive month, with the first month calling for interest
at $81.86, the next month at $75.19, and so on.

This demonstrates

that the interest is not figured on separate obligations of • ^ t j
$1,000.00 per month, or each month l s interest would be the same.
The interest is determined by the lump sum which the notes total. :
In addition the note itself says that the holder shall have the
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right to declare this note due for default in payment of interest.
As can be seen, defendant has made no payment whatsoever on this
account, not even on the interest which was due monthly per the
•i" notes.

5

In addition, plaintiff, through its attorney gave notice i

to the defendant that acceleratipn^was;Soing to take place if
he did not bring current his payments, which at that point con"Jc ;

sisted of the first $1,000.00 check that was returned unpaid,
and the first four

(4) monthly installments, and defendant

ignored said notice. * ' * ; *;. •;»... .-..• .- • :• :* i^ioj::,*; -. *.

ro,:. •>••;•

.-J., ^ill^::*^!.

CONCLUSION

be:'• - In Conclusion, it is respectfully urged that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the

c

i

?

Default Judgment where plaintiff strictly conformed to the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and where defendant*
totally ignored all judicial process; and where defendant was -.'- ,!-.;
afforded all of the rights and privileges of every defendant

: :, >

subject to the same applicable rule within the State of UtahoQu, .;_'•>'
as required by due process and equal protection; where the

t

defendant has failed to establish any grounds for setting aside
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I

the Judgment; and where no meritorious defense to the action was
shown by the Affidavits of defendant. Accordingly, this Court
should affirm the Order of the trial court denying appellant's
Motions.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. McCOY
RICHARD B. CUATTO
Attorneys for Respondent
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